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To Improve the State and Condition of Man:
The Power to Police
and the History of American Governance
THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. By Markus Dirk Dubber.
Columbia University Press, Pp.288. $50.00.
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINSt
... in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare ....
Preamble, United States Constitution (1788)1
The universal Law of Right may then be expressed, thus: 'Act
externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy Will may
be able to coexist with the Freedom of all others, according to a
universal Law.'
Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law (1796)2
t Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, Chicago. I wish to thank
Roy Kreitner, Kunal Parker, and Mariana Valverde for all their wise and
helpful advice.
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. IMMANUEL KANT, Introduction to The Science of Right, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAw: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS
THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 47 (W. Hastie trans., The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002)
(1887).
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Rule of law and rule of police are two different ways to which
history points, two methods of development between which peoples
must choose and have chosen.
Eduard Lasker, Zur verfassungsgerichte Preussens (1874)3
The 'law' of the police really marks the point at which the state,
whether from impotence or because of the immanent connections
within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the
legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to
attain. Therefore the police intervene 'for security reasons' in
countless cases where no clear legal situation exists, when they
are not merely, without the slightest relation to legal ends,
accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life
regulated by ordinances, or simply supervising him. Unlike law,
which acknowledges in the 'decision' determined by place and time
a metaphysical category that gives it a claim to critical evaluation,
a consideration of the police institution encounters nothing
essential at all. Its power is formless, like its nowhere tangible,
all-pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states.
Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" (1921)4
The further in time we depart from the Enlightenment,
the greater our apprehension at its prescriptions for human
perfectibility becomes; the keener the questions we ask of
their details; and the more skeptical our responses to their
performance. In the American case, for example, we notice
that We the People's prescription for a state of perfection,
justice, tranquility, and universal well-being lives cheek by
jowl with the purposeful textual sedimentation of
enslavement: precisely 143 words separate the United
States Constitution's soaring self-justification from its
paydirt, the three-fifths compromise. 5 And of course there is
more to come. Before the Founders exit Article I, a
3. EDUARD LASKER, ZUR VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE PREUSSENS 208 (1874),
translated in LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL TRADITION 353 (1957).
4. WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS,
APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 287 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund
Jephcott trans., 1986).
5. See U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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guarantee of twenty more years of international slave
trading is tacked onto the blessings of liberty.6 A few
clauses after that, the Founders agree that restraint of
movement shall be part of the fundamental law that ushers
in the new state-not just the movement of the "fugitive
slave" but of any and every person "held to Service or
Labour."7 Seemingly, the texts that secure "Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity" must, to that precise end, be
riddled through with the violence of necessity-civic
hierarchy and the means to its enforcement. The primal
American statement of enlightened autonomy lies alongside
the political and legal economy of alterity and subjection.8
Markus Dubber's passionate and provocative book on
the police power intends at once to expose and to sever the
link, to rescue human autonomy from the necessity of
hierarchy. 9 His history of the police power is philosophically
committed to a strict demarcation between rule of law and
rule of police as modalities of human development, the
same demarcation made explicit by the nineteenth-century
German liberal, Eduard Lasker.10 The position Dubber
6. See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
7. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
8. Hence William Lloyd Garrison's denunciation of the U.S. Constitution as
a covenant with death." See Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Constitutional
Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner's Theory of Interpretation
n.1, www.lysanderspooner.org/PLJINT.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) (citing
Resolution Adopted by the Antislavery Society (Jan. 27, 1843)). The figure of
speech is taken from Isaiah 28:15 (King James): "We have made a covenant
with death, and with hell are we at agreement; when the overflowing scourge
shall pass through, it shall not come unto us: for we have made lies our refuge,
and under falsehood have we hid ourselves."
9. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005).
10. See KRIEGER, supra note 3, at 352-53 (1957). Lasker (1829-1884) had an
American following, so much so that on his death the U.S. House of
Representatives resolved (in a gesture of provocation against Chancellor Otto
von Bismark):
That his loss is not alone to be mourned by the people of his native
land, where his firm and constant exposition of, and devotion to, free
and liberal ideas have materially advanced the social, political and
economic conditions of these people, but by the lovers of liberty
throughout the world.
Edward Lasker, http://38.191lencyclopedia.org/L/LA/LASKEREDUARD.htm
(last visited June 26, 2005).
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advocates is essentially Kantian. 11 By rule of law, Dubber
means principled commitment to the realization of personal
autonomy for all, to the rights of persons, as the only means
to just resolution of conflict among autonomous equals. Law
is the power to protect rights and remedy wrongs. "[L]aw
concerns itself with, and only with, the harm one person
inflicts upon another."12 By rule of police, Dubber means
the management of men and things, and of men as things.
1 3
In Blackstone's classic statement, which echoes throughout
the book, police is the maintenance of "due regulation and
domestic order" in the state, whereby "the individuals of the
state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to
conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety,
good neighborhood, and good manners; and to be decent,
industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations."
14
The rule of law, hence, is autonomy; of police, it is
11. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 111, 112-13, 160; see also IMMANUEL KANT,
Division of the Science of Right, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 54-
58.
12. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 111.
13. Id. at xiv, 160. Chief Justice Taney put it thus in Thurlow v.
Massachusetts (License Cases):
[W]hat are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the
extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law,
or a law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring
certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within
its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say,
the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within
the limits of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates;
and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its
power to pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by
the constitution of the United States. And when the validity of a State
law making regulations of commerce is drawn into question in a
judicial tribunal, the authority to pass it cannot be made to depend
upon the motives that may be supposed to have influenced the
legislature, nor can the court inquire whether it was intended to guard
the citizens of the State from pestilence and disease, or to make
regulations of commerce for the interests and convenience of trade.
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847). On people as
articles of commerce, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) and
generally Mary S. Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants,
Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REV.743 (1996).
14. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162
(1769). DUBBER, supra note 9, at xii.
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heteronomy. 15 Law is ex post; its criterion is remedy. 16
Police is ex ante; its criterion is efficiency-prevention,
manipulation, improvement. 17  Law reacts; police
anticipates.' 8 Law is modern, forward-looking, hopeful. 19
Police is ancient, suspicious, authoritarian.20 It comes to us
encrusted with the blood of generations of subjects.
2 1
The categorical distinction with which Dubber confronts
us is defensible, as we shall see. But we shall also see that
it is a philosophical rather than a strictly historical-that is
to say, an empirical-distinction. Historically, law and
police manifest an almost irresistible propensity to seep
into each other, as the United States Constitution demon-
strates, so that in the end, their separation may be less
significant for its expression of distinctions specifiable in
history than for its expression of normative desire for what
law might and should be (autonomy), to distinguish law
from what police has been and is (heteronomy).
To the extent that law is less than absolutely distinct
from police, might law and police not, in fact, be considered
heteronymous? 22 In effect, Walter Benjamin suggests such
an understanding in the course of his 1921 essay, Critique
of Violence.23 Benjamin's essay, also a philosophy of law
rather than an empirical account of it, eschews Kant's
categorical imperative as a point of departure for law's
authority in human affairs, for a more basic authoriza-
15. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 3.
16. Id. at 68-69.
17. See id. at 68-69, 73, 82.
18. Id. at 128.
19. See id. at 3, 159-60, 211-17.
20. Id. at 3, 10-11.
21. See, e.g., id. at 27-36.
22. That is, not polarities but correlatives, or distinct ways of expressing the
same relationship. We should note that in developing his Science of Right, Kant
grants recognition to rights expressive of relations of heteronomy, as in
conjugal, parental and household relations, albeit very carefully defined. See
IMMANUEL KANT, Principles of Personal Right that is Real in Kind, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 108-09; The Rights of the Family as a
Domestic Society, in id. at 109-20.
23. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 4.
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tion-violence, or force. 24 Law is made by violence; law is
also preserved by violence.
[T]he function of violence in lawmaking is two-fold, in the sense
that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means,
what is to be established as law, but at the moment of
instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this very
moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an
end unalloyed by violence, but one necessarily and intimately
bound to it, under the title of power.
25
Law uses that violence to which it is 'intimately bound' to
preserve itself as a modality of rule, a "juridical order,"'26
from threats-specifically the threat constituted by violence
lying outside itself. "[T]he law's interest in a monopoly of
violence vis-A-vis individuals is not explained by the
intention of preserving legal ends [for then violence as such
would not be condemned, but only that directed to illegal
ends] but, rather, by that of preserving the law itself...
Law and police, then, are each a manifestation of author-
ized violence, police "taking over," as it were, at the moment
of law's insufficiency in the achievement of ends. When the
24. Id. at 285. It is important to note that the title of Benjamin's essay, in
its original German publication was Zur Kritik der Gewalt. See Walter
Benjamin, Zur Kritik der Gewalt, 47 ARCHly FOR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND
SOZIALPOLITIK 809 (1920-21). The original title may be interpreted as differing
from the implications of the subsequent English translation in two respects:
First, and less important, Zur Kritik der Gewalt might better be rendered as
"On the Matter of the Critique of ... " or "Toward the Critique of .... This
reinforces the correct sense of Kritik/ Critique, which is evaluative rather than
condemnatory. Benjamin is undertaking a critique and simultaneously
exploring how the critique may be undertaken. His text is perhaps more
experimental that the flatly assertive English title implies. Second, and more
important, Gewalt can also be translated as "legitimate power" or "authority" or
"public force." What is translated as "violence" thus can mean state action to
exert pressure, threaten or coerce in the name of authority, rather than
physical onslaught and destruction from any source. See JACQUES DERRIDA,
Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in ACTS OF RELIGION 234
(Gil Anidjar ed., 2002) (Force of Law is in large part an extended commentary
on Benjamin's Critique of Violence, supra note 4.)
25. Id. at 295; see also id. at 283-86.
26. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 267.
27. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 280-81.
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state for whatever reason can no longer act through law,
police, which is unlike law, steps in.28
Benjamin, however, did not argue that law and police
were the same phenomenon. Police was "violence for legal
ends"-the power of disposition. 29 But police was in
addition "the simultaneous authority to decide these ends
itself within wide limits"-the power to decree. 30 In police,
law-making violence and law-preserving violence become
the same. Police simultaneously asserts legal claims for any
decree and acts to enforce what it asserts. There are no
decisions, no limits-nothing need ever be decided. Hence
the formless, all-pervasive, spectral presence of police, the
absence of essence, what Dubber calls its "defining
undefinability."31
We will have occasion to revisit Benjamin before we are
done. Meanwhile (and as a final preliminary), if we wish to
suggest the possibility of a lesser degree of distinction
between law and police than Dubber would have us accept,
we should acknowledge that we do so not only as a matter
of historical-empirical observation, but also as a matter of
present concern. We muddy law, to some extent, not to
cleanse police, but to register cautious resistance to the
confidence, implicit in Dubber's dichotomization of these
phenomena, that law can be trusted to "overcome" the
heteronomy of police. For while, as Lasker insisted, rule of
law and rule of police may well imply utterly distinct
28. See id. at 287.
29. Id. at 286.
30. Id. at 287. As Benjamin puts it, there is the police that "accompany[ies]
the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by ordinances, or
simply supervise[es] him," and then there is the police that is intervention " 'for
security reasons' in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists." See id.
31. DUBBER, supra note 9, at xv, 120; see also id. at 120; BENJAMIN, supra
note 4, at 287. Benjamin states that "[u]nlike law, which acknowledges in the
'decision' determined by place and time a metaphysical category that gives it a
claim to critical evaluation, a consideration of the police institution encounters
nothing essential at all." Id. What does this mean? As Derrida puts it, a
decision "cuts and divides." DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 252. It is finite. But "if
the act simply consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program or effecting a
calculation," there is no decision. Id. at 251. Police, that is, is not a decision but
an absence, embodied in the suspension of differentiation between law-making
and law-preserving violence. Therein lies its spectrality, its lack of definition or
limit. "One never knows who one is dealing with, and that is the definition of
the police ... unlocatable." Id. at 276.
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philosophies of human development, it is not so clear,
particularly in the current conjuncture, that in fact they
follow different strategies.
Dubber's purpose in this book is to change our
understanding of the police power by subjecting the police
concept to critical historical analysis. 32 On the success of his
critique turns the bite of Lasker's sense of absolute
difference, and the persuasiveness of his own turn to law-
figured-as-autonomy. To Dubber's critique, then, we should
turn without further delay. In Part I, I will offer an account
of The Police Power, sticking reasonably closely to Dubber's
text, confining commentary to instances of disagreement
(not particularly extensive) in historical interpretation.
Then, in Part II, I will attempt to situate his text in legal-
historical discourse, by asking of it, crudely, why this
subject; why now? I will examine the most important
contours of Dubber's analysis, attempting a critique of the
critique. And I will address the central relationship-the
relationship between law and police.
Considered as a work of scholarship, The Police Power
is a deeply penetrating appraisal of the historical
expression and significance of the concept of police. But
because the book extends its purview beyond history, one
must also ask whether Dubber's considerable insights
provide a basis for critique of the present. Of this I am less
convinced.
I. DESCRIBING THE POLICE POWER
Western political theory and practice has been
organized by a contrast between two modalities of
governance-autonomy, or self-government, and heteron-
omy, or government of the self by others. Governance as
such rarely exists in any polity in one or the other pure
form, but this does not preclude an idealization of these
modalities as distinct in essence. Hence, people may govern
themselves by making law, but they and their affairs are
also governed, administered, and managed, which is police.
32. One must know the history of the idea of police, Dubber argues, or one
will fail to understand the nature and scope of the police power. "And that is
precisely what has happened in modern American law." In law's failure lies
considerable danger. "A power obscured cannot be checked." DUBBER, supra note
9, at 159.
[Vol. 531222
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Law and police, Dubber tells us, have distinct histories and
distinct genealogies, and conceive of the state in very
different ways:
From the perspective of law, the state is the institutional
manifestation of a political community of free and equal persons.
The function of the law state is to manifest and protect the
autonomy of its constituents in all of its aspects, private and
public. From the perspective of police, the state is the
manifestation of a household. The police state, as paterfamilias,
seeks to maximize the welfare of his-or rather its-household.
3 3
Seen in Aristotelian terms, the law state can exist only
on the basis of the police state. The "political community of
free and equal persons" was precisely the community of
household masters, or (in Roman law) paterfamiliae, each
rendered free from the necessities and obligations of self-
support by a household of subordinates, servile persons
organized in a rank-ordered hierarchy-"wife, servant,
slave"-to perform the "necessitous struggle for livelihood"
that sustained the master in his enjoyment of a life of noble
and free action and virtuous civic participation. 34
Autonomy, then, was produced for the master from the
activities of the oikos (household) community, or familia,
over which he presided. It was the master's responsibility,
in turn, to manage the welfare of the familia through his
direction of the use of the household's resources-human
and material, men and things.
The fundamental legal-political distinction that
emerged from the household polity was, inevitably, between
householder and household. Whether as members of the
ancient Graeco-Roman household or of its medieval
successor, the Germanic Mund, it was the fate of the vast
majority of people to be subjects governed by household
masters. The exterior of the household-the polity itself,
and politics-became identified with the condition of the
tiny minority of household masters, such that when later
nineteenth-century romantic legal historians fastened on
the Teutonic "germ" theory of Anglo-Saxon democracy,
masters became the prototype of free men. For those who
33. Id. at 3.
34. WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH, HOUSEHOLDS: ON THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF
THE ECONOMY 4-8, 27 (1993).
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lived on the interior of the household and participated in its
economy, however, household governance "defined daily
life. '35 The facts of household governance were relatively
straightforward: a leveling down of distinctions among
subjects in the face of the fundamental distinction between
subject and master, from which emerged the classic
exchange that defined the household model of rule-loyalty
(ligeance) in exchange for protection. 36 The same pattern
was repeated on the grand scale of the king's household,
which became effectively coequal with the realm and point
of origin of the state, and into which all microhouseholders
were incorporated as subjects of the king's authority as
macrohouseholder. "Whatever distinctions might exist
among the member of the kingly household, before the king
everyone was equal ... in their inferiority as constituents of
the king's familia." All households manifested variety in
contents-persons of different status, animals, material
goods. But all differences "paled in comparison to the one
defining distinction, that between every constituent of the
household and the householder. '3 7
Thus developed the patriarchal household as the model
for governance of the vast majority of the population of
Europe. From it came the foundational components of early
modern legality, particularly criminal law, and of political
theory. The peace of the household (its legality) was
constructed by allegiance. Breach of allegiance was felonia
(felony)-the "uroffense," as Dubber puts it, that generated
the "urpenalty" of outlawry.38 From the poenalization of
felony, originating in the concept of amercement (fine in
mitigation) grew eventually modernity's complex hierarchy
35. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 10; see also id. at 8-11.
36. Id. at 11-14, 49-50.
37. Id. at 16-18. Dubber's succinct but necessarily condensed summary of a
long and complex historical process leaves him acknowledging but not
investigating the contours of potent jurisdictional conflicts between the claims
of the king and of "inferior" householders outside the arena of criminal law. On
the structures and ideologies of governance that claimed and distributed
jurisdiction to rule in early-modern England, see, for example, HOLLY BREWER,
BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION
IN AUTHORITY (2005) and RICHARD LACHMANN, FROM MANOR TO MARKET:
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1536-1640 (1987).
38. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 15, 24; see also id. at 14-21.
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of offenses and punishments. 39 The ultimate breach of
allegiance was to kill the king, the macrohouseholder, or to
"compass or imagine"40 the king's death. This was high
treason. Treason was also the ultimate breach in all
microhouseholds, as "[w]hen a Servant slayeth his Master,
or a Wife her Husband, or when a Man secular or Religious
slayeth his Prelate, to whom he oweth Faith and
Obedience."' But this became petty treason only, a
distinction that underlined the differentiation of the king
from other householders as the king's household grew to
encompass all. Discipline within all households was the
creature of punishment, which by its long lasting corporal
form (for example, whipping) signified the abasement of the
offender before the household master, the reinforcement of
the felon's meanness.42
Thus, in the police of the household-the enforcement
of obedience-we find the origins of modern criminal
justice's key components, offense and punishment. Indeed,
to Dubber, the law of crime and punishment has always
been and continues to be "the most awesome" and "the most
patriarchal" manifestation of the police power.43 In
Dubber's analysis, the object of criminal law is to act as an
agency of protection of the welfare of the state "considered
as a family."44 The power to punish remains "rooted in the
notion of police."45 Relations between householders, in
contrast, were not amenable to household discipline. As in
Aristotelian republican theory, householders in European
monarchic polities constituted the community of free and
equal persons. The monarch's responsibility lay in
providing means for the resolution of disputes amongst
these equals, "not to enforce obedience, but to do justice."4
6
Here we encounter the realm of law for the first time in
Dubber's analysis, a realm of civic adjustments among
39. Id. at 20.
40. Id. at 22-23 (quoting 25 Edw. III stat. 5 cl.2 (1351)).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 23-36.
43. Id. at xi, xv.
44. Id. at 48; see also id. at 48-62.




equals, 47 a realm that the Enlightenment's radical ideals of
equality and political autonomy would greatly elevate and
that would become embodied in notions of substantive
right.48 But householders also remained members of the
macrohousehold of the monarch. So, to the extent that their
actions, or conflicts amongst themselves, might become
threats to the macrohousehold's peace, they remained fully
subject to its police.
So too, in early-modern liberal political theory, we find
the realms of equality and police distinct but entwined. For
Locke, the power to make law, to legislate, could come only
from the consent of those for whom law was made. 49 But the
power to execute law once made against threats within the
polity, or to protect the polity from threats from without,
were powers of police, nonconsensual. "In this realm of
administration, or housekeeping, the model of household
governance survives intact, undisturbed by political theory
and its elaborate apparatus for scrutinizing the legitimacy
of state action. After Locke, governing through law must be
legitimate-and for him that meant consensual. Governing
through police, by contrast, came to be held to a lower
standard, of minimum competence." 50 Consigning the test of
legitimacy to law making and to the mandarin science of
politics allows police unchallenged occupancy of the
humdrum-"management of the societal household."5 1
Indeed, the new sciences of politics and of police, of the
47. Criminal law could be law, Dubber emphasizes, only if envisaged or
reinvented as a system of "right, structuring relationships and conflicts among
persons, rather than controlling threats to the household." Id. at 181.
48. For Dubber the elevation of law (as he defines it) to the point of
generating tension with governance as police is a comparatively recent
occurrence. "It didn't arise until what J.B. Schneewind has termed 'the
invention of autonomy' in enlightenment political and moral philosophy, and
particularly in the work of Rousseau and Kant. Only at that time was autonomy
identified as a characteristic of personhood, rather than as an attribute of
status, and of householder status in particular." Id. at 160 (quoting J.B.
SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1998)).
49. Id. at 46-47; see also BREWER, supra note 37, at 90-98.
50. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 47 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 47; see also id. at 47-49.
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state as consent and of the state as an apparatus of
administration, emerge more or less at the same moment.
52
The expansion and elaboration during the eighteenth
century of enlightened sciences of politics and police (and, of
course, of law53) marks the consolidation of the state as
such, and the relative eclipse of the microhousehold as a
meaningful unit of governance. "As the entire state
transforms itself into a single family, Rousseau's 'great
family of the state,' the urfamily becomes one social group
among others within the iiberfamily of the entire realm,
under the authority of the iiberfather, the king."54 For
England and its North American colonies, Blackstone's list
of offenses against "the Public Health, and the Public Police
or Oeconomy" offers a summary guide to the state's growing
capacities to prevent disturbances to domestic order,
marshal the resources of the household-kingdom, and
generally intrude itself into the detail of life in the micro-
households of the realm and the social order of the whole. 55
Preventive police, for example, exists in Blackstone's
sanitary references to the enforcement of quarantines and
regulation of the sale of provisions: it is worth noting that
these, like the sumptuary regulations, gaming statutes, and
game laws that he also listed enforced social station and
punished people who were found out of their assigned
place.56 Blackstone's "rules of propriety" and decency, such
52. That is, during the century beginning 1650.
53. On the development of police science, see DUBBER, supra note 9, at 63-
77. See also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39-43 (1993); supra notes 15-39. On law as science, see 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 2-33. Kant's great work on law was, as Kant
indicated in its title, intended to restate the fundamental principles of
jurisprudence-the philosophy of law-as "the science of right." See KANT, supra
note 2.
54. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 50 (quoting JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A
DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1755)).
55. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 161-75. Dubber discusses Blackstone in
some detail in both the English and colonial contexts. See DUBBER, supra note 9,
at 48-62.
56. Thus "if any person infected with the plague, or dwelling in any infected
house, be commanded by the mayor or constable, or other head officer of his
town or vill, to keep his house, and shall venture to disobey it; he may be
inforced, by the watchmen appointed on such melancholy occasions, to obey
such necessary command." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 161; see also id. at
161-62, 170-75. On the police of quarantine, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
2005] 1227
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
as those preventing clandestine marriage and polygamy,
had the same effect. 57 The state's vital interest in
preventing disturbances and promoting popular indus-
triousness is similarly expressed in the proliferation of
regulations "against the good order and oeconomy of the
kingdom"-idle soldiers and mariners wandering the realm,
gypsies, idle and disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds.
All mobility without engagement was a species of vagrancy,
purposeless uncontrolled wandering beyond the scope of
household government, a waste of resources and as such,
inherently offensive to the state. Idleness was (and
remains) a particular object of state suspicion. "Idleness in
any person whatsoever is . . . a high offense against the
public oeconomy."58 Like all of Blackstone's police offenses,
the power to mobilize labor expressed the king's desire and
obligation "to maximize the welfare of his household, the
realm."59
In England and its colonies, as a theory of consent
begins to dominate the political foreground, setting
conditions on authority's use, police proliferates in the
background, forming the character of authority in
operation. Proliferation, though, bred no transformation of
the concept in Anglophone discourse: in Blackstone's
conception, police remained rooted in a conception of
household management, part "of his general theory of the
royal prerogative, which is nothing but a modernization and
radicalization of the age-old power of the householder over
his household. ' 60 It was in continental Europe that police
more completely transcended its household origins to be
reborn as a science of governance and economy, "the science
of administering a 'population' with the aim of maximizing
its welfare," an academicized knowledge "complete with
treatises, university faculties and training academies"
'61
concentrating on the development of the tools necessary to
that end: statistics, to keep an inventory of the population;
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-97 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 1979).
57. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 163-64.
58. Id. at 165-70.
59. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 58; see also id. at 58-59.
60. Id. at 65.
61. Id. at xiii.
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documents (passports, passes, permissions, tickets of leave,
timetables) to trace and control its movements; constant
reporting to improve the state's knowledge of its objects and
of the effects of its administration; manuals to direct its
operations. 62 Nor was the science of police confined to
population. All the state's resources fell within its
purview-men and things. Police became a science of
immense precision, "of endless lists and classifications ,"
' 63
and of immense discretion: it "applied to everyone and
everything and everywhere" but with "an essential
vagueness ... guidelines but no firm principles" that left
the policer absolute discretion "to do whatever needed to be
done. 16 4 Thus, there was "a police of religion, of customs, of
health, of foods, of highways, of public order, of sciences,
commerce, manufactures, servants, poverty. . . ." Police
science "aspire[d] to constitute a kind of omnivorous
espousal of governed reality, the sensorium of a
Leviathan. ' 65 Much more than merely a mechanics of
control, police science was an aesthetics of good order, of
self- and other-improvement. Police produced "the well
policed person. . . 'polite,' considerate, even beautiful.
'66
One can find some reflection on the sophistication and
ambition of continental police science in Adam Smith's
1762-1763 Glasgow University lectures on moral
philosophy, gathered in a manuscript entitled "Juris
Prudence or Notes from the Lectures on Justice, Police,
Revenue and Arms. .".."67 What is interesting about Smith's
discourse on police was how critical and, essentially,
dismissive it was. First, contrary to Blackstone, who, as we
have seen, would supply police with a domestic genealogy,
Smith treated police as an alien phenomenon, "French."
68
62. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 71-72. On the "swarming" of disciplinary
mechanisms, see FOUCAULT, supra note 56, at 211-27.
63. Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 10 (Graham Burchell et al.
eds., 1991).
64. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 72.
65. Gordon, supra note 63, at 10.
66. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 73.
67. ADAM SMITH: LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,
1978). DUBBER, supra note 9, at 63-64.
68. SMITH, supra note 67, at 331.
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Second, Smith made police a residual category of
governance, distanced from the realization of justice,
devoted instead to the expedient-cleanliness (sanitation),
public security, and above all the "the proper means of
introducing plenty and abundance into the country," that is,
the means of improvement of the wealth of the state.
69
Smith considered matters of cleanliness and public security"of too mean a nature" to be included in a University of
Glasgow lecture, though noting with fine condescension
that they were "no, doubt matters of considerable
importance." 70 The improvement of the wealth of the state,
of course, was a different matter. It would become Smith's
most famous concern, his lectures on police eventually
transmorphing into his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations.71 But what is of particular interest
is the extent to which The Wealth of Nations was written as
a refutation of police as a modality of wealth maximization.
Smith's lectures, in short, decisively distinguished the jural
(law) from the prudential (police); identified "the first and
chief design of all civil governments" as "to preserve justice
amongst the members of the state and prevent all
encroachments on the individualls in it, from others of the
same society," or, stated differently, "to maintain each
individual in his perfect rights;"72 confined the prudential to
very specific functions, most of which were too "mean" to
warrant much attention;73  and finally, began the
development of an account of political economy that in its
fullest statement would answer continental police's
cameralist theories of wealth maximization through state
manipulation of its resources (men and things) with a
politics of markets, individual self-interest and freedom of
movement. 74 Or in other words, autonomy.
69. Id. at 333.
70. Id. at 331. Smith explained: "The netetg of a country regards the
regulations made in order to preserv[e] cleanlyness of the roads, streets etc. and
prevent the bad effects of corrupting and putrifying substances. This could
never be treated of in this place." Id.
71. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 64. See generally DONALD WINCH, ADAM SMITH'S
POLITICS: AN ESSAY IN HISTORIOGRAPHIC REVISION (1978).
72. SMITH, supra note 67, at 7.
73. See supra text accompanying note 70.
74. See generally WINCH, supra note 71. See also TOMLINS, supra note 53, at
75-78.
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Thus, in Smith we encounter an extended theorization
of autonomy that elevates it to a matter of determinative
behavioral significance in law and economy. Well and good.
But it is precisely police's meanness that, at this point,
becomes its cloak. As we have seen, liberalism's mandarin
discourses-of consent as the test of law making (Locke), of
autonomy as the object of law and justice (Smith) and the
road from economic serfdom (Anglophone economics)
concentrate on the high ground of governance. Police, by the
very lowliness attributed to its objects, flies under the
radar.75 In Anglophone discourse, its conceptual head was
raised infrequently, and only by those, such as Patrick
Colquhoun and Jeremy Bentham, interested in building
upward from quotidien policing to theories of the production
of happiness through strategies of prevention and
discipline. 76
To this point, The Police Power has concentrated on
establishing the historical character of police and law.
Hereafter, Dubber moves to his subtitle, "the foundations of
American government." Or perhaps, more accurately, the
foundations of government in the United States; for,
Dubber properly contends, it was not until the late
eighteenth century that "the concept of police entered
American political and legal discourse. ' 77 One may of course
detect many prior manifestations of police as a modality of
governance throughout the North American colonies:
regulation of the poor, of indentured servitude, and of
vagrancy; plantation management of enslaved Africans;
slave patrolling; church and household discipline; petit
treason and corporal punishment. "Americans were policing
long before they imported the concept of policing . . .
combining long-standing governmental techniques from
English law . . . with innovations and adaptations of their
own."7 8 When the revolutionary generation discovered the
75. As Benjamin has told us, police is "formless . . . nowhere tangible, all-
pervasive, ghostly." BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 287.
76. On Colquhoun, see TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 79-80; Mark Neocleous,
Theoretical Foundations of the "New Police Science," in THE NEW POLICE
SCIENCE: POLICE POWERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Markus Dubber &
Marianna Valverde, eds., forthcoming 2006). On Bentham, see DUBBER, supra
note 9, at 68-70; TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 46.
77. DUBBER, supra note 9, at xi.
78. Id. at xiii; see also id. at 28-36, 51-53, 59-62.
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concept of police for the first time, they drew upon a long-
standing practical familiarity with "a wide array of
governmental practices" that the concept "named, and
apparently systematized.
'79
Though Dubber's object of attention as a historian of
the police power is its genealogy, surprisingly he expresses
little interest in establishing with any precision the
genealogy of its conceptual transportation to, and adoption
in, post-revolutionary America. "[I]t doesn't much matter
whether the Founding Fathers picked up the police concept
from Blackstone or Beccaria or Bentham, or Adam Smith or
any of the eighteenth-century police scientists."80 The
reason it doesn't matter is that, as we have seen, Dubber
argues "the core idea"8' was invariant across the Anglo-
European spectrum, deeply expressive of the ordered
oeconomy of the ancient patriarchal household, unaffected
by its continental restatement as a science. Politics was the
self-government of autonomous householders; police was
their government of their household economies. What had
occurred in the eighteenth century was a convergence of
these two levels of governance, autonomy and heteronomy,
politics and economy, creating the "oxymoronic"82 science of
political economy. But in fact it does matter, to some extent
at least, how the founding fathers understood police. For
the convergence that Dubber describes was mediated
differently in Anglophone and continental discourse, in the
one case by liberal political science (consent),8 3 and in the
other by administrative science (police). The result was
distinct approaches to politics, to economic theory, and to
the objects of governance that situated the points of
convergence of autonomy and heteronomy at different
points along the spectrum of possibility. Compare
continental Europe, particularly Germany (the home of
police science) and England, for example, and one will
discover wholly distinct sciences of economics-the one
emphasizing historical and contextual circumstance, the
other postulating the operation of invariant a priori
79. Id. at xiii.
80. Id. at 81.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally BREWER, supra note 37.
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principles. Far from an oxymoron, "political economy"
stands for the relative "conditions of freedom" that shall
pertain in an economy and for the basis upon which
outcomes shall be justified.
8 4
Whatever its genealogy, Dubber does establish beyond
doubt the presence of the core patriarchal idea in the
Republic's theory of goverance. That presence created, of
itself, an inherent contradiction.8 5 The founding theory of
the republic was supposedly self-government-enlightened
autonomy. Its founding statements stressed the equality of
all. A patriarchal police was, hence, far more explicitly in
tension with theories of governance in the new United
States than old Europe. Revealing some consciousness of
this, early state constitutions, even as they acknowledged
and embraced the state's governing role vis-A-vis its
"internal Police," defined that role as one under the
supervision of "the people." The Delaware Declaration of
Rights (September 1776) is typical: "the people of this state
have the sole exclusive and inherent Right of governing and
regulating the internal Police of the same."8 6 State
constitutions established exclusivity of right in two
directions-first that it lay in the people of the state,
directly represented in democratic legislatures, rather than
any other agency; second, and subsequently, that it lay in
the people of the state as against any other layer of
governance. As each state re-created itself as a political-
jurisdictional successor to a colony-an autonomous self-
governing entity with known borders and an interior-it
located sovereignty in its people and established exclusive
jurisdiction in their name over its internal affairs and
arrangements (its internal police). The concept of police
became, piecemeal, virtually synonymous with the power to
govern itself, and police became the police power, a power
identified in each of the several states, exercised in and by
84. Thus the French Soci~t6 d'Economique Politique met in 1855 to debate
whether "the right of property [is] better founded on the principle of social
utility than on the principle of justice and individual right." See HEATH
PEARSON, ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMISTS' NEW SCIENCE OF
LAW, 1830-1930, at 25 (1997). See generally id. at 5-42.
85. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 82.
86. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 136 (1980) (quoting DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 4 (1776)).
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the states, that only the states had.8 7 The police power had
become the power to govern, transferred by revolutionary
succession from the king.88
Majoritarian legislative democracy-the course followed
by many of the states during the confederation period-
bred police legislation that, Dubber argues, was remarkably
(for supposedly revolutionary polities) continuous with
Blackstone's English model of police, which as we have seen
was built on the king-householder's standing as
paterfamilias to the entire nation.8 9 Dubber is thus deeply
skeptical of claims made by scholars (such as me) that the
discourse of police emerging in the new post-revolutionary
states "gave political voice to a conception of republican
government . . . as a means, informed by constitutional
declarations of communal as well as individual rights, of
maximizing opportunities for the sovereign people to
participate in the framing of the collective good."90
Continuities in the practice of heteronomy are simply too
marked, he argues, its genealogy too compelling to allow for
any kind of epistemological break in the concept.91
One must be careful here to take note of the sources of
opposition to the democratization of police. Opposition came
from "those who spoke in the more conventional idiom of
elite dominion," such as Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, Boston
attorney and future judge of the Boston Municipal Court,
who identified "excellence" in the city's police precisely with
a shifting of governance from the town meeting to "a
simple, united and energetic government under the gravest
and wisest of citizens. ' 92 The goal was "a well-regulated city
... where each knows and preserves his own place," where
"regular gradation" and the "orderly distribution of duties"
would result in a "correct arrangement and subordination of
87. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 86.
88. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 78 (1851).
89. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 83.
90. TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 58-59; see also id. at 35-106.
91. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 220-21 n. 19.
92. See PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, AN ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF
MASSACHUSETTS CHARITABLE FIRE SOCIETY, AT THEIR ANNUAL MEETING, IN
BOSTON, MAY 31, 1805, at 5-21 (1805).
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the parts which constitute a magnificent whole."93 In fact,
much of the half century after the Revolution was spent
emptying popular sovereignty of any real substantive
content. "Suffrage limitations . . . discriminate[d] against
the propertyless, women, slaves, children . . . [and anyone]
under the police of some person."94 Membership in the
sovereign people, for purposes of political action, became
limited to those who could demonstrate a sufficiency of
autonomy.
Independently, during the 1780s, culminating in the
writing of the federal constitution, state governance
capacities came under attack from national elites anxious
that the states still remained excessively democratic-in
behavior, if not in franchise-and uncontrollable, that their
exercise of police powers materially threatened elite
property rights. "The internal police as it would be called &
understood ought to be infringed," Gouverneur Morris told
the Philadelphia convention.95 Morris cared little about the
states' use of their powers in pursuit of a Blackstonian
agenda. His concern was "paper money and other tricks [of
finance] by which citizens of other States may be
affected. '96 The convention agreed that the authority of the
new national government it was designing should extend to
the enactment of legislation "in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also to those in which the States
are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation. '9
7
Dubber represents the creation of the Union as a
consensus that left the police power both untouched and
associated exclusively with the states. In the patriarchal
logic of household government, the states remained
independent households, free to police within their borders,
and subject to no superior federal police power but only to
93. Id., quoted in TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 95-96; see also id. at 133-37.
94. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 84.
95. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 26 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937).
96. Id.
97. TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 62-63 n.8.
2005] 1235
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
federal law made with their own participation. 98 In broad
terms, this is indeed the case. There is no federal police
power as such. On the other hand, the Constitution's
preamble, as we have seen, embraces a concept of the Union
as the perfected outcome of an enlightened police effected
by the Constitution itself. And the substance of the
Constitution actually limits the states' capacities to police
not only beyond what was strictly "internal" but also within
the internal in certain crucial respects. Article I, Sections 8-
10 describe wide-ranging federal powers that
simultaneously removed "a broad range of legislative
powers in the economic domain from the state
legislatures."99 Here, the Commerce Clause became the
decisive arbiter of which government got to exercise a de
facto police. Simultaneously, Dubber agrees, the
Constitution constructed a de facto police power for the
Union in areas that it declared outside state jurisdiction:
for example, management ("government and regulation") of
land and naval forces, of immigration and naturalization,
and of relations with indigenous peoples. 100 Given that the
United States was the reincarnation and continuation of an
imperial process of continental expansion, these were
crucial and strategic realms for federal power.
The effect of the Constitution, then, was to leave the
states' police powers unimpaired within the domain of
"internal police" left to the states by the federal
constitution. "The clear assignment of police power to the
states, and only to the states, dramatically simplified
constitutional analysis. If it was police, it was the states'
business."101 But this was only to remove the qualifier-
"if'-to the terrain of the now constitutionalized argument
over what police was.
Constitutionalization added the further wild card of
judicial determination of outcomes to the mix. The
prominence of the judiciary in American police processes,
98. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 86.
99. Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited,
74 J. AM. HIST. 798, 811 (1987).
100. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 86-87. For conferral of rule-making
powers of government and regulation on the federal government in various
spheres of activity, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-5, 14, 16.
101. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 86.
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however, long predated the constitutionalization of
American law and politics. In England and its colonies, the
magistracy had long been the first line of local
administration and enforcement of police regulations-its
own institutional history as "justices of the peace" was
founded on the creation of an office to enforce the regulation
of labor mobility.10 2 In early nineteenth-century American
cities, "police" and municipal courts were established as
institutional successors of local magistrates, administering
local police regulations and common law offenses-the
Blackstonian core of the Anglophone police regime. 10 3 But
the constitutionalization of the police power had, as we
have seen, rendered the police 'power open to inquiry into
its potential limits. The evolution of judicial review, itself
controversial, identified the courts as the locale of inquiry.
"And so it is in judicial opinions, specifically in judicial
opinions on the constitutional limits of the power to police,
that we find the most extensive, and certainly the most
influential, treatments of the nature and sources of the
police power."1 04 Constitutionalization, the emergence of
judicial review, and the Kantian identification of law as the
idealized expression of a general autonomy all come
together at the same post-Enlightenment, post-
Revolutionary moment when the otherness of law to police
emerges and is debated.
Perhaps most interesting in Dubber's account of this
debate is his contention that its default setting holds police
as a mode of governance in essence limitless until shown
otherwise. Rather than contained by the discourse of law,
Dubber would have us think of police as a largely
unexplored terrain. To the extent that law contains police,
it does so only in specific realms of contention. 0 5 Judges-
at least state court judges-appear quite complacent in
sustaining the default: Dubber offers copious examples of
judicial discourse emphasizing police's protean nature, its
102. See ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH,
1348-1381: A TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE AND LAw 23-24, 50-51 (1993).
103. For commentary on the Boston Police Court, created in 1822, see
TOMLINS, supra note 53, at 271. On New York, see id. at 132. On the role of the
judiciary in the police regime, see generally DUBBER, supra note 9, at 93-119.
104. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 94.
105. Id. at 94; see also id. at 94-138.
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obviousness and inevitability, in fact the impossibility of
imagining appropriately-ordered human existence without
police. As Isaac Redfield of Vermont put it in Thorpe v.
Rutland & Burlington Railroad Company (1854):
One in any degree familiar with [the police of the large cities]
would never question the right depending upon invincible
necessity, in order to the maintenance of any show of
administrative authority among the class of persons with which
the city police have to do. To such men any doubt of the right to
subject persons and property to such regulations as the public
security and health may require, regardless of merely private
convenience, looks like mere badinage. They can scarcely regard
the objector as altogether serious. And generally those doubts in
regard to the extent of governmental authority come from those
who have had small experience.
10 6
Defending the proposition that American legislatures
had "the same unlimited power in regard to legislation
which resides in the British parliament, except where they
are restrained by written constitutions," Redfield took
illustrations of police in action from the never-contested
Blackstonian core and used them to find against a railroad
corporation that had not fenced its track, contrary to
statute, in an action for damages for loss of sheep struck by
a locomotive. 107 Lemuel Shaw had done something not
dissimilar three years earlier in the iconic nineteenth-
century police power case Commonwealth v. Alger (1851), in
finding that it was a perfectly appropriate exercise of the
police power to specify the dimensions of wharves in Boston
Harbor, so that one built in violation of statutory
specification and found liable to abatement could
legitimately be destroyed and the owner fined.108 Though its
boundaries were difficult to mark or limits to it easily
found, the police power was nevertheless "a settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
society." 10 9 The fitness of its exercise by "well-ordered
governments" was "so obvious, that all well-regulated
106. 27 Vt. 140, 156 n.t (1854).
107. Id. at 142-43, 149-50.
108. See 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53.
109. Id. at 84-85.
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minds will regard it as reasonable." 110 Both judgments
illustrate the difficulty state courts had in finding how
there could ever fail to be a police power. Shaw's opinion,
for example, built the police power on a string of
conveyances of sovereignty (his term) dating to the earliest
moment of English colonizing: the colonial charter that
clothed government with so much of the royal prerogative
as was necessary to maintain and regulate public right in
the colony; the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty
of Paris (1783) that dispelled whatever royal prerogative
capacity remained; and the Massachusetts Constitution
that secured the entirety of sovereign power-dominion and
regulation of the public right-to the new post-colonial
government. Successive conveyances had created the means
to establish Alger's well-ordered society rather than any
explicit act of sovereign popular consent or active
involvement.111
In the federal realm, in contrast, police power discourse
acquired spatial referents. The "if' question-whether
something was police-depended on where and to whom
and to what it was applied. We have seen that the federal
constitution established a de facto police power in the
national state (a power, one might say, "that durst not
speak its name") by allocating to the federal state police of
the nation's outsides -Indians, immigrants, international
commerce and so forth. Here, constitutional discourse very
deliberately excised significant realms of action from
juridical purview without much argument. Developed early
in the Marshall Court's Indian cases, the notion that
Congress and its agents could assert "plenary" (exclusive)
powers of governance beyond courts' capacity to review was
enriched and extended during the course of the later
nineteenth century in a series of Supreme Court cases
addressing the government, transfer and dispersal of
Indian tribes, the regulation and restriction of immigration,
and the administration of new territories (continental and
transoceanic). 1 12  The combination of the Court's
110. Id. at 85 (1851). Dubber discusses both Thorpe and Alger, and related
cases, at some length. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 85, 104-19.
111. See 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 64-93.
112. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 467 (1846); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Chae Chan
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acknowledgment of the ascendancy of plenary over juridical
authority with its development of "political question"
doctrine-in which it refused to exercise the jurisdiction it
did possess in matters considered "inherently political" and
hence the business of the executive and legislative branches
of government-erects a constitutional law that constrains
not police but rather the effectivity of liberalism's legalist
panacea itself.113
The nation's interior presented a more difficult
problem. The states enjoyed "internal police," but this could
clash with federal jurisdiction over the nation's outsides
when states framed regulatory measures that competed
with federal authority. Dubber uses the Supreme Court's
decision in Mayor of New York v. Miln 1 4 as an illustration.
New York law required that masters of incoming ships file
a report with state authorities of all passengers brought
into the state.115 Miln, a shipmaster, had been fined
$15,000 for failing to file. 116 He argued that the state
statute was invalid under the Commerce Clause. 117 Under
Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court had used the
Commerce Clause quite aggressively to establish an
exclusive federal jurisdiction over commerce. Under Roger
Taney, matters changed. State law that affected interstate
and international commerce was valid and would remain so
as long as Congress chose to abstain from actively asserting
its jurisdiction. The state's statute was justified as a"regulation . . . of police," hence well within state
capacities. 118
It is apparent, from the whole scope of the law, that the object of
the legislature was, to prevent New York from being burdened by
an influx of persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651 (1892); United States v. Hing Quong Chow, 53 F. 233 (E.D. La.
1892) (discussed in DUBBER, supra note 9, at 141-42); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
113. "Political question" doctrine originated in Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 467.
114. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
115. Id. at 130.
116. Miln, 1837 U.S. LEXIS 169, 1 (discussed in the "prior history" section).
117. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 131.
118. Id. at 132.
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countries, or from any other of the states; and for that purpose a
report was required of the names, places of birth, &c. of all
passengers, that the necessary steps might be taken by the city
authorities, to prevent them from becoming chargeable as
paupers.
119
Interestingly, while Justice Story, in dissent, 120 held out for
the Marshall Court's position that federal jurisdiction was
exclusively whether Congress had acted or not, he did so in
terms that acknowledged the formidable extent of the police
power that underlay the state's claim:
I admit, in the most unhesitating manner, that the states have a
right to pass health laws and quarantine laws, and other police
laws, not contravening the laws of congress rightfully passed
under their constitutional authority. I admit, that they have a
right to pass poor laws, and laws to prevent the introduction of
paupers into the state, under the like qualifications. I go further,
and admit, that in the exercise of their legitimate authority over
any particular subject, the states may generally use the same
means which are used by congress, if these means are suitable to
the end. But I cannot admit that the states have authority to enact
laws, which act upon subjects beyond their territorial limits, or
within those limits, and which trench upon the authority of
congress in its power to regulate commerce. It was said by this
Court in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat
419, that even the acknowledged power of taxation by a state,
119. Id. at 132-33.; see also Paul Finkelman, The Taney Court, 1836-1864:
The Jurisprudence of Slavery and the Crisis of the Union, in THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 80 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
Finkelman adds:
The police powers doctrine would remain a permanent part of
American federalism and constitutional law. In Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia (1851), the Taney court would reaffirm
the doctrine in allowing the port of Philadelphia to require that ships
involved in interstate commerce hire a local pilot to guide the ship to a
dock. Ultimately, Miln and Cooley set the stage for local regulation of
interstate and international commerce in the absence of federal
regulation. This was one of Taney's most lasting contributions (or
alterations) to constitutional law and illustrates a significant break
with the Marshall Court tradition.
Id. Miln is discussed in DUBBER, supra note 9, at 143-45.
120. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 153 (Story, J., dissenting).
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cannot be so exercised as to interfere with any regulation of
commerce by congress.
12 1
As Dubber notes, addressing "the distinction between
state and federal power" quite clearly "captured the breadth
of police, external and internal, personal and apersonal"
and simultaneously illustrated police's conceptual role in
American constitutional jurisprudence "as the boundary of
state power vis-a-vis the power of the national
government." 122 But this, we must acknowledge, has been a
shifting boundary, accompanied, furthermore, by
considerable debate over the substance of power asserted on
each side of the line. Never was this more the case than in
the century following the Civil War, when both line drawing
and substance were greatly complicated by alterations in
both the character and the balance of power in the
American state brought about by accelerating social and
economic change, and by the evolution of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. From the Slaughter-House
Cases through West Coast Hotel, as a consequence, one
encounters a sequence of Supreme Court cases that attempt
to define and redefine the practical realms of police and law
in both state and federal spheres. 123
121. Id. at 156.
122. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 143.
123. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). On the transformation of the state by
Civil War and Reconstruction, see RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE
LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877
(1990). On the impact of social and economic change, see MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET,
THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988). On the evolution of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of
Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975). See also Howard
Gillman, The Waite Court, 1874-1888: The Collapse of Reconstruction and the
Transition to Conservative Constitutionalism, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 124 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005); Linda
Przybyszewski, The Fuller Court, 1888-1910: Property and Liberty, in id. at 147;
William E. Forbath, The White Court, 1910-1921: A Progressive Court?, in id. at
172; Melvin I. Urofsky, The Taft Court, 1921-1930: Groping for Modernity, in id.
at 199; William G. Ross, The Hughes Court, 1930-1941: Evolution and
Revolution, in id. at 223.
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Among all of these, The Police Power isolates Lochner v.
New York 124 for attention. Though Dubber makes this
notorious case the subject of a fascinating analysis that
serves to throw into high relief the law/police distinction
that is key to his book, it seems to me an error to address
Lochner in comparative historical isolation, for the case has
an argumentative context that deserves at least some
attention.
Why does Dubber invest such significance in Lochner?
The case, which set aside a New York State law limiting the
hours of bakery workers as "an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual
to his personal liberty," 125 was in his estimation nothing
less than a historically isolated, magnificently futile stand
"for the proposition that the state's police power is not
unlimited."'126 In Lochner, the Supreme Court fumbled for
both "an understanding of the nature of police .. .[and] an
understanding of its legitimate limits"' 27 that would
subordinate the police power to law and establish
constitutional limits on its use. That the State of New York
possessed a power to police was not in question. Nor did the
Court question the state's capacity to use its police powers
to protect "the safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the public."'128 But the Court found that the Hours Statute
did nothing to protect the public as a whole, merely a
particular segment of the public (bakery workers), and that
it did so by depriving them of the opportunity to exercise
full freedom of contract, thus denying them substantive
autonomy. However careless or sloppy the majority may
have been in their formulation of the issue, Dubber argues
the Court's stance was entirely appropriate. "Lochner did
what courts, and the public, should do in the American view
of law and government: it subjected state action to
principled scrutiny. More specifically, it scrutinized the
state's exercise of its police power, a power that
traditionally had been defined by its undefinability."'129 In
124. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
125. Id. at 56.
126. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 191.
127. Id.
128. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
129. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 195.
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form and execution, the Court's scrutiny might have been
wanting, but not "the larger enterprise of exploring the
limits of state police power."'130
Dubber notes, as have others, that the Court was not
showing itself hostile to the use of state police powers to
enact hours legislation as such. In Holden v. Hardy (1898),
it had upheld Utah legislation limiting hours of work in the
state's mining industry on the grounds that protection
against hazard was in the public interest. 131 In Muller v.
Oregon (1908) it would again uphold state limitation of
hours of work, this time in the case of female laundry
workers, accepting the state's contention that women's
reproductive capacities were put at risk by unpoliced hours
of work, constituting an "emergency" that threatened the
natal well-being of the race. 132 The approach taken in
Lochner did not, that is, ordain "the unconstitutionality of
the sort of economic and social regulation so dear to
progressives of the time."133 Curiously, however, Dubber
does not much investigate precursors of Lochner-other
explorations of the bases upon which limits to the police
power might be erected. Yet such had been a characteristic
of Supreme Court constitutional debate for the previous
thirty years. The Slaughter-House Cases (1873), for
example, are famous for Justice Stephen J. Field's dissent
from the majority's decision to uphold Louisiana's creation,
for public health reasons, of a slaughterhouse monopoly in
New Orleans. The dissent was woven from two strands-
one an attempt to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
resort to the state's police powers, the other the statute's
interference with the rights of butchers to follow their
trade. As to the first, the State had argued that the act "was
adopted in the interest of the city, to promote its cleanliness
and protect its health," and hence "was the legitimate
exercise of what is termed the police power of the State."1 34
Such a power, Field noted:
130. Id.
131. See 169 U.S. 366 (1898); see also DUBBER, supra note 9, at 193-95.
132. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see also DUBBER, supra note 9, at 195-96.
133. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 196.
134. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 86 (Field, J., dissenting).
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undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting the health, good
order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and is exercised on a
great variety of subjects, and in almost numberless ways. All
sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed under it, and,
when these are not in conflict with any constitutional
prohibitions or fundamental principles, they cannot be
successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal. With this power of
the State and its legitimate exercise, I shall not differ from the
majority of the court.
135
But only two provisions of the statute could properly be
called police provisions, those that confined the landing and
slaughtering of animals to a particular district outside the
city, and those that required the inspection of the animals
before they are slaughtered. "When these requirements are
complied with, the sanitary purposes of the act are
accomplished. In all other particulars, the act is a mere
grant to a corporation created by it of special and exclusive
privileges by which the health of the city is in no way
promoted."'1 36 As to the second, Field argued that the state
could not be allowed, "under the pretence of prescribing a
police regulation ... to encroach upon any of the just rights
of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure
against abridgment.' 137 It was:
one of the privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow
such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as
he may see fit, without unreasonable regulation or molestation
and without being restricted by any of those unjust, oppressive,
and odious monopolies or exclusive privileges which have been
condemned by all free governments. 138
[Such] equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging
and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout
the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the
United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions,
all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as are
imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and




138. Id. at 106 (quoting Live-Stock Dealers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live
Stock Landing, 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 6972)).
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pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure
the good order and advance the general prosperity of society, but,
when once prescribed, the pursuit or calling must be free to be
followed by every citizen who is within the conditions designated,
and will conform to the regulations.
139
This, Field concluded, was "the fundamental idea upon
which our institutions rest."'140 Citing both Adam Smith and
the Fourteenth Amendment, he held it "essential to the
validity of the legislation of every State that this equality of
right should be respected."'14 It was a matter of profound
regret that the majority had permitted Louisiana's
legislation to "reject[ ] and trample[ ] upon" citizens'
equality of right, "for by it the right of free labor, one of the
most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is
violated."142
Over the following thirty years, Slaughter-House's
minority became Lochner's majority. Field reiterated his
demands that the Court develop a new police power
jurisprudence in Munn v. Illinois (1877), which upheld state
regulation of property-grain elevators-devoted to a use in
which the public had an interest. 43 In dissent, Field once
more condemned indiscriminate state resort to its police
power, "which, from the language often used respecting it,
one would suppose to be an undefined and irresponsible
element in government,"'' 44 and repeated his contention
that the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protected
citizens from state regulations that threatened their
enjoyment of life, liberty and property.
The legislation in question is nothing less than a bold assertion
of absolute power by the State to control at its discretion the
property and business of the citizen, and fix the compensation
he shall receive. The will of the legislature is made the condition
139. Id. at 109-10.
140. Id. at 110.
141. Id.
142. Id. On due process, see also id. at 115-18, 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting);
id. at 125-28 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
143. See 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
144. Munn, 94 U.S. at 145 (Field, J., dissenting).
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upon which the owner shall receive the fruits of his property
and the just reward of his labor, industry, and enterprise.1
4 5
In Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois
(1886), the Court changed course, severely curtailing state
resort to police powers in matters of commerce by affirming
federal exclusivity, silently vacating Miln.146 Defenders of
state police powers, now in the minority, were reduced to
using some of Field's language recognizing state capacities
to regulate in an attempt to embarrass him. 147 In Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota (1890),
the Court majority adopted the Slaughter-House and Munn
minorities' due process arguments, 148 and in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana (1897) it affirmed unanimously that due process
would trump state police powers where the latter might be
found to have infringed upon "the privilege of pursuing an
ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding and
selling property," for these were "an essential part of [a
citizen's] rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by
145. Id. at 148.
146. 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886). The majority stated:
Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the
foundation of the Illinois statute it is not the province of this court to
speak. As restricted to a transportation which begins and ends within
the limits of the State it may be very just and equitable, and it
certainly is the province of the State legislature to determine that
question. But when it is attempted to apply to transportation an entire
series of States a principle of this kind, and each one of the States shall
attempt to establish its own rates of transportation, its own methods to
prevent discrimination in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious
influence upon the freedom of commerce among the States and upon
the transit of goods through those States cannot be overestimated.
That this species of regulation is one which must be, if established at
all, of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and
wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations, we think is clear
from what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of commerce,
as we think we have demonstrated it is, and as the Illinois court
concedes it to be, it must be of that national character, and the
regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules and principles,
which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United
States under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Id.
147. See id. at 589.
148. 134 U.S. 418, 456-58 (1890).
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the Fourteenth Amendment." 149 The Court added that its
judgment did not mean that a state could no longer exercise
its police power in any such case. Rather, it meant that the
substance of any exercise was subject to the Supreme
Court's scrutiny, case by case. "When and how far such
power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these
subjects must be left for determination to each case as it
arises."'150  Thinking again now of Lochner and its
companions, Holden v. Hardy and Muller v. Oregon, we can
see that case by case consideration is precisely what the
Court undertook. As Dubber notes, scrutiny of such state
police power measures continued into and beyond the
1930s.151
Given this history and context, why, then, does Dubber
make so much of Lochner? The answer lies less in the
decision per se than in the potential of the decision and the
reaction to the decision. On its face Lochner, like its
predecessors, addressed only social and economic
regulation-just one tiny fragment of police power usage.
"[P]olice power measures included all manner of ... laws
designed to control the dangerous classes."'1 52 The police
power provided the basis for the "entirety of the criminal
law."'1 53 The police power was the basis for state segregation
statutes, state eugenics statutes, state criminalization of
interracial marriage, state sodomy laws and "a host of other
threats to the moral police of the public,"' 54 all matter-of-
factly accepted. The Court's trajectory toward Lochner was
confined within a very narrow path of inquiry-Field's
initiating Slaughter-House dissent, for example, eschews
critique of the state's powers of moral and criminal police,
concentrating, as we have seen, on the citizen's economic
liberties. 155 Lochner, to Dubber, represents a majority's
modest move toward meaningful and principled judicial
review of police power legislation with the potential for
149. 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897).
150. Id.
151. See DUBBER, supra note 9, at 195-98.
152. Id. at 197.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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eventual extension to that vast m6lange of laws and powers
that is the police power, a move nevertheless significant in
its apparent confirmation of a shift in juridical discourse
(first intimated in Allgeyer) from a jurisprudence of
charting limits to one of actual scrutiny, and the quite
radical implications of such a shift:
The narrow issue in Lochner was the propriety of a particular
piece of social legislation. The broad issue was the legitimacy of
state police power, and the need to justify exercises of that power
in every instance, and in reference to specific criteria subject to
meaningful scrutiny, not only by the courts, and not only under
the constitution, but by the political community at large and on
the basis of whatever principles of legitimacy that define it.156
It is, one must confess, difficult to find in Lochner any
hint at all of quite so expansive an agenda. But the urgency
of the question that underlies Dubber's seizure of Lochner,
indeed underlies his entire book-that is, whether
heteronomy or autonomy shall rule157 -and is not
weakened by that absence. As we shall see, the question is
less historical than philosophical, but the effects of failing
to answer it, or even ask, lie littered all about us today, in
the vast regime of restraints and powers, matter-of-factly
accepted, that constitute the state in contemporary life.
The responsibility for that litter does not escape those
"progressive critics" who vilified the Court for its Lochner
decision. 158 But their concerns-with perhaps the exception
of Oliver Wendell Holmes (for whom, as Dubber shows, the
whole exercise of trying to specify something called the
police power of the state and scrutinize its use was simply
an absurdity, "for the simple reason that all governmental
power was police power")159-were for the preservation of
progressive social and economic legislation. In this they
were not unsuccessful. But responsibility lies more with
those who, from the outset, were desirous of ensuring the
inviolability of the state's capacity to police "men and
things" as it chose, and who, hence, criticized Lochner as an
156. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 196.
157. See id. at 211.
158. Id. at xiv, 194, 196.
159. Id. at 201.
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instance of judicial overreach that imperiled state power-
and did so with such success that Lochner's promise of
meaningful scrutiny of assumed authority remained
unrealized.
Among them, we find Roscoe Pound, whose 1909
critique, Liberty of Contract, provides a fitting point upon
which to terminate the first part of this excursion into
Dubber's Police Power.160
In Liberty of Contract, Pound attributed the
jurisprudential tendencies that informed the majority in
Lochner to the influence of an exaggeratedly individualistic
juridical ideology that denigrated "public right"; to an
excessively "mechanical" or conceptualist mode of juridical
reasoning that ignored practicalities; to an absence of
regard for the societal role of state power; and to the
general prevalence of legal principles over "situations of
fact."'161 His ideal was a "sociological" jurisprudence that
would "adjust[ ] . . . principles and doctrines to the human
conditions they are to govern."162 Just what this meant in
practice is best illustrated by the approach Pound
advocated in the realm of criminal and municipal justice.
As Michael Willrich has established in some detail, Pound
was a key figure in the turn-of-the-century reconstruction of
urban court systems as managers of urban populations
through the discretionary application of "socialized law."'
163
In the cities, socialized law meant "centralized judicial
bureaucracies with specialized branches"'164 such as (in
Chicago's case) branch courts addressing discrete
populations and problems-domestic relations, morals, and
juveniles. 165 More important, it meant giving law a new
therapeutic role. As Willrich describes it, the socialization
of law brought the installation of "staffs of disciplinary
personnel" or "social experts" as strategic players in the
160. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). See also
Note and Comment, The Police Power and Liberty of Contract, 7 MICH. L. REV.
507 (1909) [hereinafter J.F.K.].
161. Pound, supra note 160, at 457-58.
162. Id. at 464.
163. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 98 (2003); see also id. at xxxi-xxxii, 96-115.
164. Id. at xxxii.
165. Id. at 114-15.
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court bureaucracies. "Psychologists, psychiatrists,
physicians, social workers, and probation officers
examined offenders and advised judges on the best
'individual treatment' given the offenders' mental makeup,
family background, and social history."'166 As Progressive
Era innovations spread, 'treatments' proliferated:
To the conventional punitive measures of fines and incarceration,
state legislatures added the far more discretionary techniques of
indeterminate sentences, probation, parole, compulsory medical
treatment, routine commitment to state institutions for the insane
or feebleminded, and eugenical sterilization. In socialized criminal
justice, the case was only the starting point for a much broader set
of investigations and interventions that aimed not so much to
punish crime but to reform criminals and the larger social world
that had produced them. 167
As we have seen, Dubber argues throughout The Police
Power that criminal law is "the most patriarchal
manifestation" of this most patriarchal power. In the early
twentieth century, cheered on by Roscoe Pound, we see that
patriarchal manifestation acquiring the fully elaborated
form that would become the modern twentieth-century
criminal justice system. Pound was fully aware of the
patriarchal origins of the authority of the state to
criminalize and punish. 6 8 Rather than scrutinize that
authority, Pound desired its refinement and extension to
"secur[e] social interests regarded directly as such, that is,
disassociated from any immediate individual interests with
which they may be identified." 6 9 What were those social
interests? "The general security, the security of social
institutions, the general morals, the conservation of social
resources, the general progress" and, trailing last, "the
individual life.' 170 Preemptive interventions "to prevent
disobedience" would be the new order of things-social
166. Id. at xxxii.
167. Id. at xxxii-xxxiii.
168. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 126-27.
169. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF
CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxii (1927), quoted in DUBBER, supra note 9, at 169.
170. Pound, supra note 169, at xxx, quoted in DUBBER, supra note 9, at 169.
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control, "preventive justice."'171 This was the police power
with the bit between its teeth.
II. CONSIDERING THE POLICE POWER
Ambitions to preempt and prevent are no strangers to
the early twenty-first century. This alone provides one
immediate and potent answer to the question that I posed
at the outset: "Why this subject; why now?" And indeed, the
police of the international sphere no less than of the nation
has attracted growing attention from contemporary
politicians, scholars, and advocates of all stripes. For
example, the contemporary Anglo-American project to allow
only a conditional or probationary sovereignty for states
that, in its estimation, ignore their obligations to what one
might term "the natural society of the human race" is a
classic instance of the intervention of Dubber's macro-
householder in the affairs of the microhousehold, of
heteronomy on a world scale. 172  Leading Canadian
intellectual Michael Ignatieffs neo-liberal agenda for
breeding "peace, order and good government" throughout
the world through the export of Canadian expertise in
administrative technocracy-he calls it, without obvious
irony, a Canadian kind of imperialism-represents another,
"softer" mobilization of the discourse of police in response to
the widespread assumption of threat posed by "failed"
states. 173 So also, one finds in the attempts of contemporary
social theorists to analyze the "state of exception" or"necessity" or "emergency" or "siege" implied in
contemporary governments' responses to that same
widespread assumption, revelation of a conceptual
171. Pound, supra note 169, at xxxv, xxxvi, quoted in DUBBER, supra note 9,
at 168,127.
172. See e.g., Andy McSmith and Jo Dillon, Blair Seeks New Powers to
Attack Rogue States, THE INDEPENDENT, July 13, 2003, at 1. RICHARD TUCK, THE
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
FROM GROTIUS TO KANT, 34-47 (1999).
173. Michael Ignatieff, Director, Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, John F.
Kennedy School of Gvt., O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Peace, Order and Good
Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada (Mar. 12, 2004),
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/Skelton.pdf; see also Ron Levi and John
Hagan, International Police, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 76;
Mariana Valverde, 'Peace, Order, And Good Government.- Police-Like Powers In
Postcolonial Perspective, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 76.
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apparatus and a history that closely tracks the police idea
and its dichotomous relationship to law. 174  Giorgio
Agamben asks:
If exceptional measures are the results of periods of political crisis
and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-
constitutional grounds, then they find themselves in the
paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be
understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as
the legal form of what cannot have legal form. 175
Describing the state of exception as "the original
structure in which law encompasses living beings by means
of its own suspension,"'176 Agamben uses as his immediate
point of reference President George W. Bush's military
order of November 13, 2001 authorizing indefinite detention
and trial by military commission of suspected terrorists, an
order that "radically erases any legal status of the
individual," whether under the Geneva Convention or U.S.
law. Detainees become "the object of a pure de facto rule, of
a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense
but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed
from the law and from judicial oversight."'177 The definition
of the true sovereign, says Agamben, following Carl
Schmitt, becomes "he who decides on the state of
exception."178
Discourses of necessity, emergency, self-preservation-
"the preventive, even anticipatory aspect of police"179-are
prominent in Dubber's account of the police concept.
Prevention, anticipation, preemption, and intervention all
"reflect[ ] the foundation of police in the unquestionable
right of self-preservation under conditions of necessity."'
80
Necessity and emergency, indeed, have always been central
to police as a mode of governance (or, in Agamben's words, a
174. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1-31 (Kevin Attell trans., 2003).
175. Id. at 1 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 3-4.
178. Id. at 1 (citing CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE (1922)).




"paradigm of government"). 181 Necessity is the rule of the
household in performance of its oeconomic role; coercion
ensures the continuance of necessity in the face of threat.
The condition is one of exception, or emergency, made
routine. Yet, fruitful conjunction with contemporary
discourses of necessity notwithstanding, the "why" of The
Police Power is not to be attributed to the onset of the
"Global War on Terrorism" and its tactics. Dubber's
purposes, rather, lie in exposure and critique of police as a
mode of governance deeply implicated in American practice
yet more or less ignored, until recently, in mainstream
American political-legal history. The Police Power is both
the latest product of a trend in Anglophone and European
scholarship that has been busy constructing a broad history
of police to replace a prior historiography that concentrated
on the organizational development of uniformed police
forces, and also a critic of directions followed by elements of
that trend.
It is unnecessary to rehearse the trajectory followed by
the "new police history" here. Suffice to say, it has tended to
concentrate on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and that we can find in it various but related points of
origin-Michel Foucault's transformative investigations of
power and of the techniques and effects of governmentality;
the "new criminology" of the 1970s; and the pioneering
institutionalist and intellectual-historical research on the
state and political economy, both European and, more
recently, American, on-going for some twenty-five years.182
It is the latter, American, work, however, that catches
Dubber's critical eye, for he finds it insufficiently sensitive
to the "deep tension" between police and democratic
181. AGAMBEN, supra note 174, at 1; see also id. at 1-31.
182. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 56; THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra
note 63; GIANFRANCO POGGI, DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION (1978); IAN TAYLOR, PAUL WALTON AND JOCK
YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE (1973);
CAPITALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: FROM DEVIANCY THEORY TO MARXISM (Bob
Fine et al. eds., 1979); WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1983);
TOMLINS, supra note 53; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Pasquale Pasquino,
Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital-Police and the State of
Prosperity, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 63, at 105.
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governance, and police and law, that his book details. 8 3
The essence of police is hierarchy and heteronomy, deriving
from its household origins. Scholars who have found in it
potential or actual realizations of popular self-government,
an energetic citizenry, and active and engaged political
communities, ignore this at their peril. For the same
reasons, scholars are equally mistaken who imagine rule of
police as a democratic alternative to rule by remote
juridical elites wielding an undemocratic common law.
184
Law, Dubber insists, in fact furnishes the only system of
rule that can protect the citizen against police. He
reinstitutes the principled distinction, eroded in much
contemporary history, between a sphere of autonomy and
individual rights and the demands, absolutist or
majoritarian, made in the name of the public good or
common-weal. 85 The common law maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas is a principle of justice symbolic of the
first.'8 6 The maxim salis populi primus lex est is symbolic of
the second. 8 7
Dubber gives his critique of trends in American
scholarship particular point by underlining the intricate
relationship between the genealogies of police and
hierarchical governance across a millennium of European
history, and in particular "[t]he inherent connection
between police science and the police state of absolute
continental monarchies" that developed during the
Enlightenment.18 8 This inherent connection supposedly
undercuts any prospect that police could be given any form
of democratic reading. The force of the critique is diluted by
Dubber's indifference to any need to specify the modes of
discursive transmission, which leaves him dependent upon
analogy. As we have seen, he tells us "it doesn't much
matter" where the Founding Fathers picked up their ideas
about the police concept, because whether expressed in
continental European or Anglo-American discourse, the
"core ideas" associated with police were invariant, rooted in
183. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 220, n.19.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 110-11.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 220, n.19.
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the household. In fact, it is indisputable that while police
was being perfected as an agency of absolutism in
continental discourse, Anglo-American political theory,
under the influence of Locke, was recentering itself on a
departure from household-derived emphases on heteronomy
and status by exploring the conceptual bases of "consent"
and contract. 189 Dubber does not ignore this development,
associated in particular with Locke, but does rather
minimize it, by distinguishing between Locke's emphasis on
consent in matters of law making and the "entirely different
matter" of law's execution-the maintenance of order. 190
Still, the existence of alternative theorizations of politics,
and, arising from those, of the bases of welfare, persisted.
By the later eighteenth century, as we have seen, one may
find in the work of Adam Smith a radical critique of police
models of political economy that posited the decisive
importance to wealth maximization of markets and
individual freedom. 191 But this was not the only course that
variation took, for it is also clear that an ideal of the
common welfare remained potent in post-Revolutionary
American thought. Whether one probes the writings of
obscure autodidacts like William Manning or elite theorists
like Thomas Jefferson, it is apparent that a great deal of
intellectual energy was devoted during the early years of
the Republic precisely (as Dubber acknowledges) to "bring
the legitimate functions of police in line with a system of
government that could not bear the distinction between
policer and policed," or in other words to render police
compatible with autonomy. 92
Dubber's approach throughout The Police Power is that
to achieve this outcome police must be placed within the
limits of law. 193 This relies on a conceptual distinction
between police and law, for, examined empirically and
institutionally, police and law in the Anglophone tradition
are far from distinct. 194 Consider, as Dubber notes, that
189. See BREWER, supra note 37.
190. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 46-47.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
192. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 91. On Manning and Jefferson, see TOMLINS,
supra note 53, at 1-8, 36, 81-89.
193. See, e.g., DUBBER, supra note 9, at 181, 211.
194. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 182.
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Thomas Paine's famous dictum, "in America THE LAW IS
KING," endorsed law rule only so far as law was recognized
to be subject to popular authority. 195 Consider that the
history of the rule of law in the United States is precisely
the history of a process locating law in the hands of
juridical elites distanced from popular authority. 196
Consider finally, as Dubber notes, that police in America, to
an extent unparalleled elsewhere, was a juridically-
administered discourse. "American courts, while helping to
exercise the police power, in their applicatory function as
inferior state officials, did more than anyone else to define
and justify it.' 19 7 Empirically and institutionally, that is,
one may argue that in the United States, police indeed was
placed within the limits of the law. The problem was that
law did not conform itself conceptually to the provision of
an ideal of autonomy.
Dubber realizes that, to be plausible, his history of the
police concept thus requires that we rewrite, or write anew,
the history of law so as to establish it as "an account of law,
or right, as such, based on the basic legal right of
autonomy."198 In other words, Dubber's history of the police
concept requires a companion history of the law concept
that conforms it to the distinction he draws, if the
distinction upon which so much of his analysis depends can
in fact be maintained.199 One has to wonder whether such
distinct histories can in fact be written at any other level
than the conceptual/intellectual. We have already noted, at
the beginning of this essay, the ease with which the
apparently enlightened autonomy embraced in the
preamble to the U.S. Constitution is succeeded by a text
devoted in good measure to the rules and practices of
195. Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field:
Narrative, Justification and Explanation, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 323, 327-28
(2004).
196. See id. at 330-32.
197. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 93.
198. Currently, Dubber observes, such an account is missing. Id. at 214.
199. Law-as-autonomy is empirically elusive in The Police Power. See
generally DUBBER, supra note 9. Indeed, it is worth observing that the absence
of a history of law as autonomy can leave the reader not a little perplexed at the
confidence with which Dubber invokes the autonomy standard to judge the
history-and histories-of police, for this renders the exercise essentially
normative. Dubber uses the conceptual to critique the empirical.
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heteronomy. Empirically, we might claim, autonomy for
some, no matter how inclusive its sphere, always turns out
to be built on the police of others, whether men or things-
of a race, a class, a gender, a people, a nation, a species, an
environment. 200
In fact, it is not at all clear that, even conceptually, law
is an expression of autonomy, or that law and police may be
treated as distinct. To develop these points, let us now, at
last, return to Walter Benjamin's Critique of Violence.
The task of a Critique of Violence, Benjamin says, is to"expound[ ] its relation to law and justice. For a cause,
however effective, becomes violent, in the precise sense of
the word, only when it bears on moral issues. The sphere of
these issues is defined by the concepts of law and justice. 20 1
Studying law and justice entails studying the relationship
of means to ends. Violence is means, but to critique violence
200. This is a large assertion that I cannot develop more than briefly.
Essentially, the claim is that autonomy always requires the exploitation of
resources, both men and things, and that all forms of exploitation are unjust,
not simply human but also animal and environmental. I will assume that the
assertion that race, class and gender exploitation is subject to moral constraint
is relatively uncontroversial. Animal exploitation has been the subject of rights
campaigning for more than 150 years. See KEITH TESTER, ANIMALS AND SOCIETY:
THE HUMANITY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (1991). As Dubber notes, the question of
animal exploitation has been given prominence by the work of such individuals
as Tom Regan. See TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); DUBBER,
supra note 9, at 159, 249 (text accompanying note 7). In addition to Regan, one
should of course note the work of Peter Singer. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION: TOWARDS AN END TO MAN'S INHUMANITY TO ANIMALS (1975). As to
environmental exploitation, the assertion that "[t]he police of things that belong
to no particular person, such as 'public lands,' or rivers or forests or mountains
or wild animals . . . doesn't require a justification for the interference with
personal rights" and "simply doesn't touch upon the realm of law, or justice,"
DUBBER, supra note 9, at 159, ignores moral notions of stewardship and in some
circumstances will prove simply ethnocentric. See WENDY NELSON ESPELAND,
THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER: POLITICS, RATIONALITY, AND IDENTITY IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (1998). Also see Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects. 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972) and Gary E. Varner, Do Species Have Standing? 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 57
(1987), which support the proposition that recognition as a rights-bearer is a
matter of convention not essence, as is, therefore, refusal of recognition.
Nonhuman legal entities do in fact occasionally gain standing 'for themselves,'
through, for example, endangered species legislation or world heritage listing.
To be fair to Dubber, one should note his acknowledgement that it is "no longer
a foregone conclusion" that animal and environmental exploitation fall outside
the category of meaningful heteronomy. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 249.
201. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 277.
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as such requires that one isolate it from ends, otherwise the
critique is simply absorbed by the justness of the end. Thus,
where (as in natural law theories) ends are paramount and
violence is a phenomenon of nature, only violent means to
an end antithetical to natural law may be termed
unjustified. Positive law on the other hand scrutinizes not
ends but means. It treats violence not as a phenomenon of
nature but of history. Positive law thus distinguishes
sanctioned ("historically acknowledged") from unsanctioned
violence independent of any assessment of ends. But
positive law still assures us that ends reached by legal
means are justified-"positive law . . 'guarantee[s]' the
justness of the ends through the justification of the
means."202 Obviously, the question becomes whether the
distinction between different kinds of violence is
meaningful.
Positive law checks resort to violence by the individual
as legal subject by ignoring the criterion of naturally just
ends. Instead, it erects legal ends (one of which is the
subordination of citizens to law)-that is, ends pursued by
legalized power. Resort to violence outside legality
undermines the system of legalization and must therefore
be suppressed, not because it threatens legal ends (for then
not violence per se but only violence directed to an illegal
end would be controversial) but because violence when not
sanctioned, "when not in the hands of the law, threatens it
... by its mere existence outside the law."
20 3
The concrete threat of unsanctioned violence is that in
contesting "the order of existing law" it has the effect of
creating new law. That is, violence is law-making. Indeed,
Benjamin may be seen as arguing that violence is
foundational to law in that no act of creation of a legal order
can have an anterior legitimation to which it can turn.
20 4
Rather, law-making-acts of creation or acts against
existing laws to transform them-can only begin from the
point of absence of legitimation, or against what exists.
Once law is made, violence preserves law, in that law uses
202. Id. at 278; see also id. at 277-78.
203. Id. at 281.
204. See DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 269; see also id. at 267-72. The origins of
law lie in a violence that Benjamin calls "mythic" or imposed by fate. See
BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 293-97.
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the threat and actuality of its monopoly of legal violence as
the means to its own safe-keeping. 205
These two forms of violence combine most fully in the
realm of punishment. Law's declared power over life,
especially the power to end life, is the ultimate law-
preserving violence. But law-making violence is also
present, for "it may be readily supposed that where the
highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal
system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely
into existence." 206 Punishment, as Dubber has shown us, is
supremely creative-it proliferates endlessly. "Its purpose
is not to punish the infringement of law but to establish
new law. For in the exercise of violence over life and death
more than in any other legal act, law reaffirms itself.
'20 7
From here we move quickly to a trenchant discovery. "[I]n
this very violence" (the violence over life and death), he
says, "something rotten in law is revealed."208
At this point, Benjamin seems to me to hesitate. He has
been insisting on a distinction between different forms of
violence, and the distinction has now collapsed under the
weight of capital punishment. Benjamin will acknowledge
this, but only indirectly, only after moving away from law to"another institution of the modern state"-police. 209 Here
also, he states, both law-making and law-preserving
violence exist alongside each other. But here their
separation is entirely suspended. "Police violence is
emancipated" from the restraints that distinct orders of
violence imply. 210 "It is lawmaking, for its characteristic
function is not the promulgation of laws but the assertion of
legal claims for any decree, and law-preserving, because it
is at the disposal of those ends. '211 But if this suspension of
the distinction is what enables police, it is also what
distinguishes police from law. They are different
phenomena.
205. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 281; DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 267.




210. Id. at 286.
211. Id. at 286-87.
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The assertion that the ends of police violence are always
identical or even connected to those of general law is entirely
untrue. Rather, the 'law' of the police really marks the point at
which the state . . . can no longer guarantee through the legal
system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to
attain.212
What is "rotten" in the state of law is, it would appear, the
corruption that spreads from police, for it is police that
instantiates the collapse of the law-making/law-preserving
distinction. But police is nevertheless kept conceptually
distinct from law.
Can this conceptual distinction be maintained? I think
not, which perhaps explains Benjamin's hesitation over the
significance of law's "reaffirmation" of itself. For
reaffirmation is both creation and preservation-production
anew and reproduction. That is law's praxis. Derrida calls it
the law of iterability, meaning that iteration and reiteration
cannot be distinguished. "[T]he very violence of the
foundation or positing of law (Rechtsetzende Gewalt) must
envelop the violence of the preservation of law
(Rechserhaltende Gewalt) and cannot break with it. It
belongs to the structure of fundamental violence in that it
calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought to be
preserved .... [T]here is no more pure foundation or pure
position of law, and so a pure founding violence, than there
is a purely preserving violence. Positing is already
iterability, a call for self-preserving repetition. Preservation
in its turn refounds, so that it can preserve what it claims
to found. Thus there can be no rigorous opposition between
positing and preserving."213
Benjamin argues that law-making and law-preserving
violence are different species of violence. But in this,
Derrida has shown, he is unsuccessful. 214 Benjamin argues
that the suspension of the distinction occurs in police. But
the suspension cannot be cabined. "He never gives up trying
to contain in a pair of concepts and to bring back down to
distinctions the very thing that incessantly exceeds them
212. Id. at 287.
213. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 272.
214. See id. at 279.
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and overflows them." 215 Law and police may be strategically
differentiated-hence heteronymous-but in their common
conceptual relation to a common violence they are of a
piece. 216
Now, we should be the first to say that Dubber's law,
figured as autonomy, is not Benjamin's (or Derrida's) law,
figured as violence/force. But here we are not traversing an
empirical argument about what law is, but rather a
philosophical argument about how we conceptualize law.
And in doing so, perhaps, we uncover the nub on which The
Police Power turns, in that although this is a book cast as a
history, and to a large extent written as one, in its central
characteristic-the proposition that an essential opposition
exists between concepts of police and law-it is making a
philosophical and not a historical argument. For while the
heteronomy of police is indeed historically indubitable, the
autonomy of law is not-it is asserted, it cannot be proven.
No history of it, we have seen, is available. 217 So, if Dubber
argues that the essence of law is autonomy, which
distinguishes it from police, it seems at this point sufficient





217. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
218. It is important to note that at one point in Benjamin's text, he moves
toward a reading of relational possibility that coincides to some extent with the
autonomy Dubber adduces for law. Just as it takes a "refined sensibility" to
detect the rottenness in law, BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 286:
[n]onviolent agreement is possible wherever a civilized outlook allows
the use of unalloyed means of agreement. Legal and illegal means of
every kind that are all the same violent may be confronted with
nonviolent ones as unalloyed means. Courtesy, sympathy,
peaceableness, trust, and whatever else might here be mentioned are
their subjective preconditions.
Id. at 289. But he continues, "Their objective manifestation, however, is
determined by the law ... that unalloyed means are never those of direct, but
always those of indirect solutions. They therefore never apply directly to the
resolution of conflict between man and man, but only to matters concerning
objects." Id. That is, autonomy cannot characterize direct relations between
men but only indirect relations mediated by "objects"-goods, commodities. This
presents Dubber with the considerable irony that law-as-autonomy is possible
only where things are the immediate concern, not people. Recall that, for
Dubber, "law concerns itself with, and only with, the harm one person inflicts
1262 [Vol. 53
2005] THE POWER TO POLICE 1263
That one can read differently is indeed evident in the
most dramatic moment of the book itself, in which, we have
seen, Dubber rescues the Lochner decision from "the
enormous condescension of [in this case liberal-legal]
posterity. ' 219 For Dubber acknowledges, there are several
different ways of reading the case, only one of which is his.
First, we may read Lochner as a narrowly-conceived display
of laissez-faire jurisprudence negating a state's legitimate
resort to its police powers; or, second, as an exercise in
laissez-faire jurisprudence negating legislative regulation of
the conditions of labor on the grounds that this was an
attempt by the state to claim a commerce power not within
its jurisdiction, camouflaged as a use of the state's police
powers; or, third, as a principled scrutiny of a police
regulation to determine whether it was "fair, reasonable
and appropriate" as opposed to "unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary. '220 The orthodox liberal critiques concentrate
on the first and second readings: Lochner was a "judicial
usurpation of the legislative prerogative" that smuggled''conservative anti-labor laissez-faire views into
constitutional doctrine. ' 221 Dubber finds these readings
understandable, given progressive concerns for the
enhancement of regulatory capacity, but dogmatically
indifferent to the absence of accountability of state power.
He concentrates on the third-scrutiny of resort to "a
particular aspect of the police power in a specific context"-
arguing that this is exactly what the American view of law
upon another. . . . A person who suffers harm from something other than
another person is not the law's concern." DUBBER, supra note 9, at 111.
Benjamin points to one instance of unalloyed means as "the conference,
considered as a technique of civil agreement," where "the exclusion of violence
in principle is quite explicitly demonstrable by one significant factor: there is no
sanction for lying." Id. Even here, however, unalloyed means --"peaceful
intercourse between private persons" -are constantly under pressure from
legal violence. Id. at 290-91. They decay (rot) through, for example, its
criminalization of lying, i.e. fraud or deception. Id. See also DERRIDA, supra note
24, at 284-85.
219. The phrase is E.P. Thompson's; the interpolation mine. See E.P.
THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 12 (Vintage Books
1966) (1963).
220. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 192-93 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56); see
also id. at 190-93.
221. Id. at 193.
1264 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53
and government should lead one to expect courts to do.
222
Admitting the Court's execution might have left something
to be desired in the particular instance, "the larger
enterprise of exploring the limits of state police power" in
the interests of protecting the autonomy of citizens vis-A-vis
the state was appropriate. 223 But opposition both on the
Court and beyond it eroded the initiative, 224 and while the
Court continued to examine police power cases, it returned
to an older default assumption that police powers per se
were unreviewable, beyond its ken: the only question was
whether the end sought was appropriate to the police (good
222. Id. at 195.
223. Id.
224. In McLean v. State of Arkansas, decided less than a year after Muller,
at a time when the Court appears still to have been in the phase of case by case
scrutiny (see supra text accompanying notes 150-51), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Arkansas statute establishing standards for payment of
wages in the state's coal mines, arguing as follows:
[T]he police power of the State is not unlimited, and is subject to
judicial review, and when exerted in an arbitrary or oppressive manner
such laws may be annulled as violative of rights protected by the
Constitution. While the courts can set aside legislative enactments
upon this ground, the principles upon which such interference is
warranted are as well settled as is the right of judicial interference
itself.
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909). The Court proceeded to
summarize those principles, thereby creating a basis to guide scrutiny:
If the law in controversy has a reasonable relation to the protection of
the public health, safety or welfare it is not to be set aside because the
judiciary may be of opinion that the act will fail of its purpose, or
because it is thought to be an unwise exertion of the authority vested
in the legislative branch of the Government.
Id. at 547-48. It continued:
If there existed a condition of affairs concerning which the legislature
of the State, exercising its conceded right to enact laws for the
protection of the health, safety or welfare of the people, might pass the
law, it must be sustained; if such action was arbitrary interference
with the right to contract or carry on business, and having no just
relation to the protection of the public within the scope of legislative
power, the act must fail.
Id. at 548. Lochner was not mentioned, except by counsel for the unsuccessful
plaintiff in error. Justice Rufus Peckham, the author of the Lochner decision,
dissented. See id. at 551. And one commentator concluded that in sustaining
the statute as a valid exercise of the police power, the Court "seems to have
extended that doctrine to a much greater length than it has in some of its later
decisions." See J.F.K., supra note 160, at 507.
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order) of the community as a whole and the means
employed "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals."225 The basic issue-whether the state indeed
had, or should have, the capacity to coerce citizens in the
name of the "police ... of the political community"-became
a non-question. 2
26
The police/autonomy dichotomy breaks down, however,
in a fourth reading of the case that Dubber offers, namely
that the New York legislature's statute did not restrain the
autonomy of bakery workers, as the Court argued, but
rather enhanced it. Exchange relationships between
employers and employees are invariably asymmetrical-
invocations of mythically equal citizens engaged in
exercising their freedom of contract simply camouflage
protection of sustained inequalities of resources and
status. 227 Dubber argues that this reading is consistent
with an account of law that confirms its foundation on "the
basic legal right to autonomy" asserted throughout:
In this reading, Lochner wasn't a police power case at all but a
justice power case. The New York statute ... protected the status
of bakery employees as autonomous persons under law, by
allowing them to manifest their capacity for autonomy in their
contractual relationship with their employers, rather than falling
prey to the employers' superior power.
2 28
Why, then, did the Court strike down the autonomy-
enhancing statute, choosing instead to protect and sanction
the existing asymmetry of the employment relationship
225. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), quoted in DUBBER, supra note 9,
at 200. It is worth noting the statement that occurs in Justice Stevens' opinion
for the Court in the recent and controversial takings (eminent domain) case
Kelo v. City of New London that "[f]or more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power." See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005), available at http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-
108.ZO.html.
226. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 199. Dubber notes a revival of interest in
state courts beginning in the 1980s. Id. at 203-08.
227. See, e.g., Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923).
228. DUBBER, supra note 9, at 215.
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against an attempt at legislative melioration? Does this
reading not render the heteronomy/autonomy dichotomy
that has sustained the police/law dichotomy throughout the
book murky? It would be absurd to read one case to produce
so over-determined a conclusion, yet one must also allow
that in the multiple readings of Lochner one sees precisely
the seepage of law and police into one another, a merger of
agents that produces outcomes more ambiguous than the
clarity of Dubber's dichotomy allows. One sees clear traces
of Benjamin's law-preserving violence-the violence done,
for example, in the preservation of sanctioned asymmetries.
And one sees that as an instance of reiteration, the sanction
of asymmetry-from whatever motive or principle-has
reproduced asymmetry in law, and thereby produces it
afresh.
III. To CONCLUDE: FORT-DASEIN
229
In an immediate sense, the police power evaded
principled scrutiny both of its bases and its effects because
the moment of its emergence in American political-legal
consciousness-the later nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries-was simultaneously the moment of its defense.
229. "The police become hallucinatory and spectral because they haunt
everything; they are everywhere, even there where they are not, in their Fort-
Dasein, upon which one can always call." DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 280.
"Dasein," literally "being-there," is a term from Heideggerian philosophy
describing the form of existence unique to self-conscious human beings, that is,
an existence "in" the world and inseparable from it. One cannot be without a
world to be in. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson trans., 1962). Derrida's point is that there is nowhere in
existence that police is not present, including of course that place (Fort-Dasein,
perhaps an allusion to the anomic dystopian 1981 "cop" movie, Fort Apache -
The Bronx) where we expect police definitively to be. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at
278. But police is not present anywhere particular, because it is present
everywhere. Id. The police, he says:
are not simply the police. They do not simply consist of policemen in
uniform, occasionally helmeted, armed and organized in a civil
structure on a military model to whom the right to strike is refused,
and so forth. By definition, the police are present, or represented,
everywhere there is force of law [loi]. They are present, sometimes
invisible but always effective, wherever there is preservation of the
social order. The police are not only the police (today more or less than
ever), they are there (elle est 1&), the figure without face or figure of a
Dasein coextensive with the Dasein of the polis.
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Associated in the liberal mind with benevolent resort to the
state's capacities to elevate its citizenry, the police power
became the principle means to elevate "public right,"
address the social (rather than merely individual) interests
with which public right was purportedly identified, and
thereby, ultimately, improve the human condition. The
purpose of The Police Power is to establish a basis upon
which we can think very differently-critically-about the
police power. It locates the concept of police historically in
patriarchy and heteronomy, uses that locale to define it as a
mode of governance, and counterposes to it the concept of
law, labeled justice power and expressive of autonomy, as
the essential standpoint outside police from which the
critique can be mounted.
In thus summarizing the project of The Police Power,
and to a degree throughout this essay, I have been engaging
in a professional academic exercise of "review." Here is one
more scholarly book addressing one more scholarly subject.
The routine of review categorizes its author's "contribution"
to some specific or general pool of knowledge, and moves on.
But is that all that should be said? I think not.
Dubber, like Benjamin, is telling a ghost story,230 one
full of warning for our time. For our time is one in which a
past-the past of police-has "flashe[d] up at the instant
when it can be recognized," a supreme "moment of
danger. ' 231 Throughout The Police Power, police haunts law,
indeed haunts life itself. Its spirit is ubiquitous but
formless, de-centered, dispersed and distributed, unlimited
and indefinable, always beyond law's grasp. For Benjamin,
police was particularly threatening to the life of
democracies-"the[ ] spirit [of police] is less devastating
where they represent, in absolute monarchy, the power of a
ruler in which legislative and executive supremacy are
united, than in democracies where their existence... bears
witness to the greatest conceivable degeneration of
violence."232 Derrida comments "[i]n absolute monarchy,
police violence, terrible as it may be, shows itself as what it
is and what it ought to be in its spirit, whereas the police
230. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 278.
231. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in
ILLUMINATIONs 255 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1969).
232. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 287.
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violence of democracies denies its own principle, making
laws surreptitiously, clandestinely. ' 233 The point is, we
know the truth of this so much more now than Benjamin in
1921, or even than Derrida in 1989, even after he added to
Benjamin's his own words on "modern technologies of
communication, of surveillance and interception . . . [that]
ensure the police absolute ubiquity, saturating public and
private space, pushing to its limit the coextensivity of the
political and the police domain," even after he asks, "[i]s
this the contradiction of which Benjamin thought? The
internal degeneration of the democratic principle inevitably
corrupted by the principle of police power, intended, in
principle, to protect the former but uncontrollable in its
essence, in the process of its becoming technologically
autonomous?" 234 For we now live in a new age, an improved
state of exception, our own absolute state of police.
235
For Benjamin, the only answer, the final answer, was
revolutionary violence, "a justice of ends that is no longer
tied to the possibility of law. ' 236 Thus at the end of the
233. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 281.
234. Id. at 279-80.
235. As suggested by the WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL,
HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003),
http://antiwar.com/rep/military-0604.pdf. The report, presents what Giorgio
Agamben describes as "the state of necessity ... interpreted as a lacuna in
public law, which the executive power is obligated to remedy. In this way a
principle that concerns the judiciary power is extended to the executive power."
AGAMBEN, supra note 174, at 31. But, continues Agamben:
[I]n what does the lacuna in question actually consist? Here the lacuna
does not concern a deficiency in the text of the legislation that must be
completed by the judge; it concerns, rather, a suspension of the order
that is in force in order to guarantee its existence. Far from being a
response to a normative lacuna, the state of exception appears as the
opening of a fictitious lacuna in the order for the purpose of
safeguarding the existence of the norm and its applicability to the
normal situation. The lacuna is not within the law [la legge], but
concerns its relation to reality, the very possibility of its application. It
is as if the juridical order [il diritto] contained an essential fracture
between the position of the norm and its application, which, in extreme
situations can be filled only by means of the state of exception, that is,
by creating a zone in which application is suspended, but the law [la
legge], as such, remains in force.
Id.
236. DERRIDA, supra note 24, at 286.
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Critique of Violence, Benjamin writes, "on the suspension of
law with all the forces on which it depends as they depend
upon it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a
new historical epoch is founded. '237 Dubber, we have seen,
believes that police may be made controllable, subjected to
law.238 This is his answer-like Benjamin's, no less, no
more than an "act of hope.
'239
Deep layers of ironic coincidence here cloud the
possibility that Dubber's answer is viable. Dubber begins
and ends The Police Power identifying his goal -principled
scrutiny of the police power from the standpoint of
autonomy (law)-with a project begun by Thomas Jefferson
in 1778 to interrogate governance in the new United States
from the standpoint of the "unalienable rights" declared in
the act of revolutionary violence known as American
independence, and continued in 1779 when Jefferson
established the new Republic's first chair "of law and police"
237. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 300. Writing, in the spirit of Walter
Benjamin, of the "spectral figure of the law in the state of exception," Giorgio
Agamben concludes:
One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused
objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free
them from it for good. What is found after the law is not a more proper
and original use value that precedes the law, but a new use that is born
only after it. And use, which has been contaminated by law, must also
be freed from its own value. This liberation is the task of study, or of
play. And this studious play is the passage that allows us to arrive at
that justice that ... [Benjamin] defines as a state of the world in which
the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or
made juridical.
AGAMBEN, supra note 174, at 64.
238. It must be said that elsewhere Dubber has seemed less sure, noting in
the course of a searing disquisition upon the quotidien realities of American
criminal law and procedure (police's most developed expression) that
"traditional rules of criminal law ... survive mainly as the object of theoretical
investigation and the subject of university instruction, in a parallel universe
largely untouched by the reality of the criminal process." See Markus Dirk
Dubber, The New Police Science and the Police Model of the Criminal Process, in
THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 76.
239. James Boyd White describes finding "a way of living in an unjust world
by imagining an ideal into partial reality" as an act of hope. See JAMES BOYD
WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS
307 (1994).
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at the College of William & Mary.240 Jefferson is well
known for his throwaway endorsement of revolutionary
violence,241 but his interrogation of governance from the
standpoint of the unalienable rights it had brought forth
was not at all productive, perhaps because as both a private
and a public governor, Jefferson knew only too well the
benefits of police. Jefferson the governor of slaves was
patriarch nonpareil, the classic Aristotelian beneficiary of
classic household governance. Jefferson the governor of
Virginia, in pursuit of "worthy" ends, was spectral police
incarnate. "It is very much the Interest of the good to force
the unworthy into their due Share of Contributions to the
Public Support, otherwise the burthen on them will become
oppressive indeed" he wrote to Garret Van Meter on the
occasion of Claypool's Rebellion, an obscure protest that
erupted in April 1781, centered on Hardy and Hampshire
Counties in western Virginia, against statutes passed by
the Virginia Assembly to levy taxes to subsidize the
recruitment of troops for the Continental Army, and to
requisition supplies. 242
[M]en on horseback have been found the most certain Instrument
of public punishment. Their best way too perhaps is not to go
against the mutineers when embodied which would bring on
perhaps an open Rebellion or Bloodshed most certainly, but when
they shall have dispersed to go and take them out of their Beds,
singly and without Noise, or if they be not found the first time to
go again and again so that they may never be able to remain in
quiet at home.
2 43
The governor of slaves knows firsthand that his noble
unalienable autonomy (law) has been enabled by the
240. DUBBER, supra note 9, at xii, 216 (describing Jefferson's project to
revise Virginia's laws of crime and punishment to conform to the principles
advanced in the Declaration of Independence).
241. "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison para. 4 (Jan. 30, 1787), available at
http://earlyamerica.com/review/summer/letter.html.
242. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Garret Van Meter para. 1, (Apr. 27,
1781), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/vlch3s6.
html; see also Letter from Garret Van Meter to Thomas Jefferson, (Apr. 11,
1781), available at http://www.wvculture.org/history/revwar/claypoolOl.html.
243. Letter from Jefferson, supra note 242.
1270 [Vol. 53
THE POWER TO POLICE
meanness of slavery (police). The governor of Virginia
thinks it perfectly appropriate to use agents of public
punishment clandestinely, to disappear rebellious rights-
holders from their beds, or harass them until they singly
flee, to serve "the Interest of the good."244 Is this not all too
drearily familiar? Can such men as these "revolutionaries-
turned-rulers" seriously be treated as the initiators of a
critique of the "something rotten" embedded at the heart of
this particular "state of exception" (by which, of course, I
mean "exceptional" America 245) at the time of its beginning,
as authors of first principles to which we should now
return? 246 Dubber's faith in law-as-autonomy is not naive.
But to turn to a law-that-has-never-been, a law that has no
history, as a means to resolve the degeneration of
democracy that police so pervasively has been and is,
cannot be counted as anything but an act of hope, and, I
fear, a vain one at that.
244. Id.
245. See generally DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1991) and CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM (Amy Kaplan and Donald
Pease eds., 1993) for a general discussion on the "national ideology of American
exceptionalism," ROSS, supra at 22, and the nineteenth and twentieth
discourses of exception that its realization would require.
246. Dubber argues that inspiration to resolve the problem of the American
police power can be found in the Republic's moment of origin, when "[t]he
revolutionaries-turned-rulers of the new republic.., were revolutionaries first,
and rulers second" with interests in "erecting a novel system of government
under law." DUBBER, supra note 9, at xv-xvi.
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